In late 1998, most analyses revealed a clear direction of East Timor�s future that it would be granted independence sooner than previously estimated. But no one had anticipated a bloody clash between the pro-independence and pro-autonomy groups after the popular referendum of 5 May 1999. The security problem in East Timor in the aftermath of the referendum had imposed significant impact on regional peace and stability. Many envisaged how, without proper management, it could damage regional integrity and, specifically, ASEAN internal relations. But with the spirit of regional cooperation and international concern, the problem was brought under control. Thanks to Indonesia for its frankness and open mind for the efforts it put in to resolve the problem alongside with the UN and other stakeholder. Also of utmost importance was the commitment and contribution of Australia in taking the initial step, under UN auspice, to restore immediate peace and security under the Australian - led INTERFET.

East Timor gave rise to the first UN peace enforcement mission ( under Chapter VII ) in the ASEAN regional hemisphere in the post-Cold War era. It had drawn regional attentions to internal security as contrasted to external security concern of the Cold War times. The mandates of UNTAET, by its objectives, power, and structure, has evolved from the fundamental principle of the � maintenance of peace and security � to the complex structure of � nation building. � This, in itself, has presented a great opportunity for many countries, specially those new peacekeepers, to engage. Not surprising that more than 40 countries have participated in providing civilian supports to UNTAET and 28 countries provided troops to the Peacekeeping Force. UNTAET has incorporated a worldwide regional and international participation which makes it the biggest mission in terms of the highest national participation.

A prompt response to the problem of East Timor in 1999 was not accidental. Apart from its long struggle for independence and regional and international concerns of the bloodshed, was probably the expansion of the UN�s roles in peace operations after its reform set forth since its 55^th anniversary ( 2000 ), that saved East Timor from the similar faith of Somalia in 1991. The unique characteristics of the problem and the process of problem resolution undertaking by the UN in UNTAET mission has been regarded as one of the most important UN mission in the dawn of the new century.

This paper will discuss the following issues - firstly, to point out the reasons why, in particular, we support the mission through our foreign policy and the commitment of our troops in light of the evolving uncertainty and risks; secondly, what are our achievements, in particular, what do we benefit from the participation? The result of this analysis is very important to justify to our publics of our course; and thirdly, what did we actually learn? The answers are equally important to those of the second part as improvement and development of our tools and strategy will be oriented in the right direction.

The strategic importance of the independent East Timor to Thailand in terms of defense and economic interests may not be obvious. But the deteriorating security situation there or elsewhere in our regional sphere will certainly threaten common regional interests where our strategic interests and objectives are shared. It is hard to foresee how much the local East Timor security problem can escalate to regional conflict and cause damage to global security.

Our participation in UNTAET, then, has served two purposes, firstly, it has kept maintaining our regional engagement and securing ASEAN integrity and stability which are our prime strategic interests. We believe that a successful transition to an independent country of East Timor will be one of a key factors of security and stability of ASEAN countries and the wider Asia � Pacific region. Thailand cannot be secure in an insecure region. Secondly, it expands our commitment to the course of international peace and security. Thailand as a member of the United Nations has the obligation as laid down in the Charter. East Timor had provided us the right time and the right place for participation in the UN peacekeeping operations. This has allowed our Armed Forces to perform, again, in an international arena. And only through this, it can expand its horizon and adopt itself for the approaching 21^st century.

The strategic environment of the 21^st century would require the Armed Forces to redefine its role in response to the changing context of international relations and security. The new world order where only one super power existed and where economic power overrides state�s interests has set the scene for greater uncertainties than ever before experienced. Under such evolving situation, the Armed Forces is devised to undertake wide ranging missions as defined in military operations other than war ( MOOTW ) and must be ready to support the UN peace operations.

Our achievements as the troop contributing nation ( TCN ) in UNTAET PKF could be seen at 2 levels - at national or strategic level, and at the force or operational level. Although achievement at national level relied on the achievement at operational level, their scope of effects were not identical. While at national level strategic interests were the main issue, at the operations we focussed on the effects on the Armed Forces.

Without strong international and regional supports, UNTAET would face many difficulties and would be hard to achieve its mandate. Its successes up to the present time have been greatly relied on external supports. As the mandate progressively developed to a nation - building phase, more supports and assistance of various kinds in the forms of fund and direct assistance were increasingly needed. UNTAET was not only engaged in security maintenance but in many cases was directly responsible for programs in social and economic development, education, health, and culture. These programs were crucial to bringing normal life and standard of living to people all over the country. UN agency, fund, and programs as well as NGOs of regional and international bases were main sources of funds and aides in support of this programs. Financial supports from governments all over the world had eased the hard pressed mission�s budget demands. During the two year period since its inception, UNTAET has overwhelmingly received supports from all sorts of organizations, private and governmental alike.

The government of Thailand has participated in the last two Donor conferences where more than 20 countries participated to discuss programs and funds to support the establishment of the East Timor Defense Forces ( ETDF ). We expressed our willingness to provide staff officers to the Office of Defense Force Development ( ODFD ) at this initial step, and will support further training programs for ETDF.

Needless to say, regular meeting and visits of the mission by high level officials has broadened and strengthened international and regional cooperation. We highly appreciated commitment to the course of peace by participating countries. And we were confident that cooperation for peace would get stronger and stronger.

The Armed Forces expressed a clear intention to fully participate in the UN Stand � by Arrangement system in mid 1995. Until mid-1998 that the Army did devise a directive that provided a concrete program for the preparation of forces to the UN stand-by system. The units of up to battalion-size strength were considered possible but intensive training and modified unit structure would be needed.

It was the force structure and capabilities that was the center of our discussion. What type of force structure and capabilities will suit the Stand-by system? The experiences from UNIKOM where we contributed military observers since 1991 or even UNTAC in 1992-93 where our engineer units were provided were not of much help.

We also have the experience in the Korean War ( 1950 � 53 ) where a battalion was provided to the US - led multinational enforcement operation (Chapter VII ) under the UN�s auspice. But, clearly, it was envisaged that the nature of the incoming post-Cold War peace operations will be drastically differed from what we had encountered in the past. Therefore, we ended up with putting virtually everything in the light infantry battalion that makes it more like a brigade. We seem to have problem to prepare such a force within a matter of weeks for the UN.

Until after the outbreak of the East Timor crisis that the Department of Foreign Affairs seriously called upon us to prepare force to contribute to the UN mission there. The government decided to join the Australian � led INTERFET in January 2000. In light of such a serious security situation in East Timor at that time, we decided to dispatch our readily available Rapid Deployment Battalion for the mission. This unit was airborne and air - mobile light infantry by structure. It gave us flexibility and was compatible with ADF�s operational demands, This was the first tour in a foreign land after the Vietnam War. It went well and accomplished the mission. The unit was successfully transformed to THAIBATT � 1 to undertake mission of UNTAET PKF in February 2000.

Few months after our first battalion was committed to the mission, the British Army offered us a two-year program of peace support operations training program in September 1999. The first formal training program of the battalion to be deployed in UNTAET mission was jointly planned and implemented by the Thai and British officers at the Infantry Center in January 2000 to prepare the 2^nd THAIBATT for UNTAET PKF in early August 2000.

Though, it looked rather hasty for us in the actual preparation of the force, but, after its deployment, it was able to achieve standard performance through the process of learning and adapting itself in the new environment. THAIBATT as well as commanders and staffs that our Armed Forces provided to UNTAET PKF were proven valuable asset to UNTAET. To the Armed Forces , participation by contributing troops to the mission had benefited in many ways. This will certainly have direct effect to its future development.

As a new peacekeeper, experience is very important. In most cases, what the soldiers have learned in the field could not be replaced by training or formal class room. Real experiences had enhanced performance and promoted better understanding of the environment in which the soldiers were working in. Security patrols and CMA activities allowed soldiers to contact with peoples in the form that they exposed themselves to real lives and culture. This, in return, would refine the soldiers� understanding of difficult problems and resulted in greater achievement.

Unit commanders and staffs had enhanced their planning and utilization of their resources in difficult and unexpected situation. In situation where combined operations took place, as in a composite force structure, the process would gradually internationalize the unit�s working culture and system. Interoperability needs certain level of familiarization. Working in multinational force environment requires certain degree of interoperability. Only through real work or specific training that one can achieve interoperability.

The experience from East Timor will be useful and will have value added to other future UN missions. National defense would also greatly benefit from individual experience. Put it in plain words, peace operations has offered the most useful theater for training of soldiers in multinational environment.

Not only force structure and capability but also doctrine including rules of engagement ( ROE ) were needed to be appropriate to the specific mission. Training and fully understanding of ROE is the must in enforcement operations. Dealing with riots and handling civil disturbances had entailed some sorts of difficulties in interpretation of the ROE and might result in fatal circumstances. Commanders and soldiers are needed to train together in situations where ambiguity might occur. Other agents like UNMO and CIVPOL were also required to understand PKF�s ROE. Standing Operating Procedure ( SOP ) for combined operations in law and order problems had to be clear and understood by all. This had been a very delicate issue and could mean success or failure of the mission if things went wrong, and, indeed, this had been the case in East Timor.

Force capability had been refined continuously from the experiences of INTERFET and the previous THAIBATTs. Main focus was on the increasing of mobility, communication capability, and self � sustained small team operations. Following the guideline of Force enhancement, we deployed another 30 special force troops and remained to the present. The experiences of operations in East Timor provided us with greater flexibility in preparing forces for the UN stand - by arrangement system.

Our experiences during the counter insurgency campaign during the 1970s and early 1980s had been proven useful to the operations in East Timor. Our prime objective was to gain support from the people. To achieve this, we had to engage all sectors of the community. Once security was restored, people must be allowed to return to normal lives. Peace and stability could then be maintained through sustainable development programs where participation of local people was crucial. Self � sufficient economy and sustainable agriculture could be of great interest and highly feasible at this stage for East Timor. PKF could provide guidance and support but the people must lead the program and share the sense of common responsibility.

Preventing the recurrence of violence requires preventive measures as well as proactive strategy in peacekeeping operations. Prolonged security without disruption is necessary condition for sustainable development. We believe that peace could be promoted and sustained through people�s well � beings and education.

Undoubtedly, we learned many lessons during the past two years. The most important lesson was that, in the international working environment of peacekeeping operations, successes were the result of combined efforts from network of well organized team works of multinational forces. Not only military professionalism counted, but understanding mind and cooperative habit of individuals and skills in management, communication, etc, were most desirable in working to achieve higher synergy and effective success. In most circumstances, units tended to over concentrate in what they were doing and did not have enough time to study what the other units and agencies were doing so that all efforts could be integrated and duplications be minimized.

Indeed, international environment means diversity and difference and that is why cooperation and understanding are fundamental to the success of international organization. I think we cannot do enough in terms of training to fully prepare soldiers for that. From regular visits and inspection of the unit in the field, we found that only real experience can present a meaningful lesson in international cooperation. This � in-process � training needs basic support and must be aware of by commanders of all levels.

Many difficulties were attributable to national characteristics and culture. Individual performance might depend on his/her personal attitude towards work and colleague. Here, culture played a dominant role. Negative relationship might develop from cultural interactions of the persons rather than from a clash of different working systems. In this respect, language is probably the most sensitive issue of all.

International system requires common language in use. No one will deny that now English is an international language, and of course the most used language of the United Nations. But in most cases, the UN peacekeeping missions are comprised of multi-nationals with their own distinct languages. At most, like in East Timor, only two or three nations are native - tongued English. The rest, more than 20 nations, speak their own languages. We speak Thai and we had anticipated this would be a problem. We cannot train our soldiers to effectively use English in a year. Our school curriculum requires students to study English for more than 16 years before they graduate. But still, our English skill is far behind that of the native English. We have few good English users at commander and staff levels, probably about 10 % of total troops. We know that this will present us with certain limitation in coordination and communication within the UN system. The situation in the field where soldiers had actual contact with the peoples in the districts was different as this required another language skills e.g. Tetun and Bhahasa. In proportion, our own translators and UN-provided were sufficient for operations. No countries were then better off in this respect.

Today, incorporation English into all sorts of training for UN mission has been mandatory. A one-month pre - training session for the battalion to be deployed with UNTAET PKF in the Infantry Center in Pranburi has been continuously tailored to the mission requirement. English, ROE training, local culture awareness, standard code of conduct including serious misconduct, as well as first aides, tactical and weapon skills are core subjects of the course. Staff training conducted at the Supreme HQs, Bangkok, focus on knowledge of UN system, UN staff procedure, and mission specific orientations.

At the end, successes had depended heavily on men / women themselves. We learned that without individual and collective commitment and dedication, the mission is doomed to fail. Soldiers who will make personal commitment and dedication are those who better understand their roles and appreciate the course of peace. Normally soldiers are trained for war, therefore a shift of mindset from war to peace end states must be systematically constructed within an individual.

One cannot overlook the importance of the right strategic direction in peace operations. Many missions were failed because of wrong strategy. When the mandate states that � peace and security must be maintained throughout East Timor �, our first question to ask is how to do it with our limited time and resources? There were many answers to that question in the situation of East Timor and, of course, the answers changed from time to time. National reconciliation was undoubtedly the right strategy for East Timor. Along this strategic line, the peacekeeping force then had a clear vision of its end state. In August 2000, the PKF�s center of gravity was then changed from the �militia� to � the people of East Timor.� Once immediate peace and security was restored and secured, the PKF then set off with programs in support of national policy to reconcile the people of East Timor. Countless public campaigns and political discussions at all levels through civil military activities programs

( CMAC ) were launched concurrently alongside military security operations. Public understanding and social gradual integration have developed and quickly progressed through time, and unquestionably, this was the seed of success of the constituent Assembly election of 30 August 2001.

With our experiences of the insurgency campaign in the 1970s and early 1980s, we helped contribute constructively to the reconciliation works. Peace enforcement alone is not an all in one formula for curing all problems- it could not redress and not intend to redress every problem of conflict. Force can stop violence temporarily but cannot get rid of the sources of violence. We had introduced the concept of sustainable development, which was more of strategic initiatives, into our tactical and operational imperatives. Our operations were directed to increase people�s well-being so that normalcy was attained as soon as possible. We told them that one day they will take care of their own future and their own country and we prepared them for that.

Global peace and security must be attained before the progress of mankind and civilization can be sustained. Indeed, today the world is still rampaged with bloody conflicts and tensed by many potential hot spots. Not because the course of peace is weak that makes the world insecure, but probably violence has ingrained in the very nature of human-being. History teaches us that mankind resorted to war to make peace. The United Nations� goal to

� � save mankind from the scourge of war�� might suggest that we might not be able to get rid of war in the course of our evolution. Therefore, peace will be conditionally achieved through some means.

Today, the UN takes a lead on the � maintenance of international peace and security.� The actions might take variety of forms from preventive diplomacy to enforcement action but the principle will be as stipulated in the Charter. Most of the post � Cold war peacekeeping operations have been enforcement actions curbing with intrastate conflicts. The path from ONUC ( 1961 ) to UNTAET

( 2000 ) for the UN had been up and down but never without strong supports of international community. Peacekeeping will go on and will be a core activity of the UN in this century.

We will always support the course of peace. Central to our foreign policy is the expansion of international cooperation and regional engagement. Participation in the UN peace operations will be the main theme of our commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security. Certainly, the experiences of East Timor will help us expand our vision and knowledge that will enhance our performance. But the most important of all was that we, as a member of the international community, have contributed and committed ourselves to the course of peace.